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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

13903

WILLIAM ANDREWS,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State of
Utah against William Andrews, charging him with three counts
of criminal homecide, murder in the first degree in violation
of Section 76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1953) and
two counts of aggravated robbery in violation of Section
76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1973).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
in and for Davis County, State of Utah, on November 15,
1974, after a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty
of three counts of first degree murder and two counts of
aggravated robbery.

On November 20, 1974, after a hearing

on the sentence, the jury recommended that the defendant be
sentenced to death on all three counts of first degree
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murder.

On November 24, 1974, Judge John F. Wahlquist

sentenced the defendant to death by shooting at 7:47 A.M.,
January 21, 1975, on all three counts of first degree murder
and sentenced the defendant to an indefinite term of not
less than five years to life imprisonment in the Utah State
Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing the
judgment rendered at the trial and or hearing on sentence of
this cause, and a ruling remanding the cause to the trial
court for a new trial, or in the alternative, an Order
setting aside the sentence of death and remanding the case
to the trial court for the imposition of the sentence of
life imprisonment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, William Andrews, concurs with the statement
of the facts on pages 2 to 6 of appellant, Dale S. Pierre's
brief on appeal with the following additions.

Orrin W.

Walker, the states chief witness, and an eye witness to the
commission of the crime itself, testified that the defendant,
William Andrews, was present and standing at the bottom of
the stairs of the HiFi Shop basement when he entered on the
night of April 22. He further testified that both defendant
Andrews and defendant Pierre had weapons.

Subsequent to his

intial confrontation with the two defendants, Walker testified
that the defendant Pierre's gun discharged, and that defendant
Andrews said, "What did you do that for, man?" (Tr. 3174) Mr.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Walker further testified that during the time that the
defendant Pierre and Andrews were administering the caustic
fluid and prior to the time that defendant Pierre fired the
shots, that the two defendants engaged on numerous occasions
in conversation and that defendant Andrews appeared to be
nervous and upset (Tr. 3176-77).

Furthermore, Walker testified

that at one point subsequent to the administration of the
liquid but prior to the shooting, Andrews said, !!I can't do
it, I!m scared!" (TR. 3174, 3183).

Finally, Walker testified

that prior to Pierre committing the rape of Michelle Ansley
and before any shots were fired at any of the victims, defendant
Andrews went up the back stairs, out the back door, shut
the door behind him and never re-entered the HiFi Shop again
(Tr. 3187-88).
ARGUMENT

POINT I

APPELLANT ANDREWS CONCURS WITH AND RE-ARGUES POINTS
NUMBERS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8 OF THE BRIEF OF APPELLANT,
DALE S. PIERRE.
Defendant-Appellant Pierre's brief has exhaustively and
authoritatively presented for this court arguements concerning
the unconsitutionality of the death penalty, the denial of a
fair trial and violation of due process clause because of
prejudicial pre-trial publicity, the abuse of discretion and
reversable error created by the court and the courts failure
to grant appellants motion for change of venue and for
separate trials and for allowing the testimony of Dr. Bryon
H. Naisbett to be witnessed by the jury.

The attorney for

defendant Digitized
Andrews,
onW.numerous
occassions
prior
by the Howard
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School,
BYU. to the trial
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and during the course of the trial, made appropriate motions
concerning the above issues.
were denied.

That at all times said motions

That the cases submitted in the brief of

defendant Dale Pierre in support of the issues raised
therein gave the court the most concise and conclusive
support for Defendant Andrews position.

Counsel for defendant,

Andrews, has found no other cases than those already before the
court which would assist the court in resolving these issues
and therefore respectfully urges the court to consider those
issues referred above as re-argued and submitted on behalf
of Defendant Andrews and rebutted.
ARGUEMENT

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR SEQUESTRATION OF THE JURY, BETWEEN THE PERIOD OF NOVEMBER
15, 1974, TO NOVEMBER 20, 1974, WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LIGHT OF THE ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND
PREJUDICIAL ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING APPEALLANT'S TRIAL.
Prior to the commencement of the trial on November 15,
1974, defendant's attorney, along with the attorneys for
defendant, Pierre, and defendant, Roberts move the trial
court that the jury be sequestered for the duration of the
trial so that prejudicial pre-trial publicity would be
avoided and that a fair trial be given all the defendants.
Judge John F. Wahlquist denied the defendant's motion saying
that he felt proper decorum could be observed and that: every
precautions would be taken so that the jury would not be
influenced by outside sources.
4

(The court should take
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careful note of Page 39 of defendant Pierre's brief on
appeal, as evidence that even the best precautions were not
sufficient).

On November 15, 1974, defendant, Andrews, was

found guilty of three counts of first degree murder, and at
that time requested that the court grant, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, 76-3-207 (1) a hearing on whether or not the
death sentence or life imprisonment would be imposed and
that the decision thereon be made by the jury.

Because of

the length of the trial, which had already taken four weeks,
and the necessity of counsel obtaining additional witnesses
for the sentencing hearing the trial judge ordered that the
hearing be held on November 20, 1974, five days later. At
this time, defendant's counsel renewed a request for sequestration
of the jury for this five day period (Tr. 4114) contending
that the jury members could be subjected to great pressure
over the five day period from outside sources, which pressure
could affect the sentence. Again, Judge John F. Wahlquist
denied appellant's motion.
It is clear that in light of all of the surrounding
circumstances, that the jury should have been suquestered
during the five day period between the rendering of the
verdict

and the sentencing hearing. While it is true that

sequestration is discretionary with the judge, and that many
factors must be considered, to-wit:

expense to the State,

time involved, inconvenience to the jury, that these types
of considerations must necessarily be viewed in light of the
more serious effects that failure to sequester a jury can
have in a case of this nature. As has been noted in appellant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Dale Pierre's
briefMachine-generated
and reaffirmed
here, not only was this
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a trial involving a capitol offense, wherein a potential
death sentence was at issue, but was beyond a doubt the most
widely publicized homecide case in recent Utah history. The
trial judge admitted that the pre-trial publicity was so
pervasive that he was certain there was no one who did not
have some familarity with the case.

By the time the jury's

verdict was entered, four weeks of testimony had transpired,
and had been graphically protrayed daily to the public by
both written and electronic media.

Although the trial judge

frequently warned jurors not to expose themselves to media
reports, the sheer volume of news coupled with the public
reaction could not have been barred from even the most
conscientious juror.

The obvious remedy for the court to

protect both the defendant and the jurors was sequestration.
The trial judge; however, chose to ignore the obvious, under
the shield of "judicial disgression".

In the case of

Shepherd vs. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 363, the United States
Supreme Court indicated that where there is a reasonable
liklihood of prejudicial news coverage attentant to a trial
which will prevent a fair trial, the jury should be sequestered
and in fact that the sequestration of the jury was something
that should be raised sua sponte by the court.

Therefore it

is clear that the Supreme Court intended that complete
"judicial discretion" in the area of sequestration be tempered
by the surrounding circumstances.

It is inconceivable that

the type of pressure brought about by the publicity of this
case could not have effected the jurors during the five day
6
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period between the verdict and the sentencing.

Not only

were newspapers and electronic media filled with stories
about the trial during this period of time, but no doubt
jurors were subjected to close scrutiny by friends, neighbors
and other acquaintances. While the logistics of sequestering
a jury for four to five weeks is something that the court
should and apparently did give great weight, sequestration
for only a five day period was not a great sacrifice on the
part of the state and whatever expense wpi;d be incurred was
outweighed by the inherently prejudicial effect of nonsequestration at that time.

The trial judge should have

sequestered the jury to protect its members from the influence
of both the constant and pervasive news coverage of the
trial and the attitude of the community.

This failure to do

so was an abuse of his discretion and denied the appellant a
fair trial, and further violated his right to due process
under the 14th Amendment.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing points, the Appellant
respectfully submits that the judgment rendered at trial be
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for the
purpose of a new trial, or that, in the alternative, this
Court should Order that the Appellant's sentence of death be
set aside, and direct the trial court to impose the sentence
of life imprisonment.
Respectfully submited,

JOHN T. CAINE
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